The telecommunication network is recognized by the federal government as one of the critical national infrastructures that must be maintained and protected against debilitating attacks. We have previously shown how failures in the telecommunication network can quickly lead to telecommunication congestion and to extended delays in successful call completion. However, even if the telecom network remains fully operational, the special telecommunication demands that materialize at times of emergencies, and dynamically change based on subscriber behavior, can also adversely affect the performance of the overall telecommunication network.
INTRODUCTION
We have previously found [1] * Wireline and wireless networks in a metropolitan area support each other in times of trouble. As such, the presence of multiple networks enhances overall network communications, resiliency, even though they were not designed for that purpose.
* Since either network (wireline and wireless) is equally likely to suffer a disruption, the overall resiliency is best when each network carries relatively equal loads. Disruption of one carrying much larger load may congest the smaller network. * This resiliency is caused by customer behavior in switching between networks when one is failed. But the switchover in demand onto the nondisrupted network may cause significant congestion in that destination network. This last conclusion from our previous paper was one of the reasons that motivated the analysis in this paper. User behavior and changes to it can play a critical role in how a failure propagates during emergencies [2] . It also leads to potential mitigations by educating users on how to react in times of crisis. In this paper, we investigate the resilience of the telecommunications infrastructure during emergencies (earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados flooding, etc.) where traffic surges and the telecom infrastructure can be damaged. The infrastructure scenario represents the state of the networks today, where the wireless network size roughly equals the wireline network size. To perform our study, we introduce a model for the telephony infrastructure for metropolitan service areas. Our goal is to develop a baseline functional model of the telecom system and then study the customer behavior in the presence of telecom and/or other infrastructure system failures and overloads. We first introduce our simulation that represents a metropolitan area telecommunications network. Then, we describe the disruption and overload scenarios. We pre-sent simulation results and compare the emergency scenarios in terms of network call carrying capacity and customer behavior. Finally, we conclude with a summary and future research directions.
N-SMART SIMULATION MODEL N-SMART is a discrete event (call level) telecom model that simulates capacities, blocking levels, retrials, and time to complete calls for both wireline and wireless networks. The simulation engine consists of algorithms which generate events related to calls, re-attempts, network failures, processor overloads, and simulation output. The call model across wireline and wireless networks and the interaction between the two networks based on subscriber behavior are central to the simulation [3] [4] [5] .
END USERS ACCESS DISTRIBUTION End users have a choice among alternate communication means made possible through the rapid advances in networking technology (wireline -copper, coax, fiber; and wireless -cellular, WiFi, WiMAX). At present we see some users with only wireline phones, other users with wireless phones only, and yet others with access to wireline and wireless phones at the same time. Trends in recent years show that while the number of subscribers that rely exclusively on wireline access shrinks, the number of subscribers using wireless access is increasing at a faster rate. If this trend continues in the future, it would mean that a majority of subscribers will eventually have access to both wireline and wireless communication. The technology trend also promises to offer these users multiple modes of using their telecommunication venues.
THE REATTEMPT MODEL First a typical call attempt arrives at a particular switch for a certain destination switch, as described by the traffic load and the traffic profile. The attempted. A reattempt model based on [6] is used in the simulation. According to this model, a call would reattempt with a certain reattempt probability after an exponentially distributed reattempt time. Reattempt parameters are a function of whether the call was blocked due to no answer, line busy, or network busy. These dispositions determine how fast reattempts will be made. The historical reattempt model parameters [6] are shown in Table 1 . The probability row in Table 1 indicates that 13% of all calls are met with no answer (or an answering machine) and 6% of calls are met with a busy tone. knowledge of it. N-SMART incorporates a detailed probabilistic model to reflect these network switching events for reattempts. In fact, this switching of endpoints shifts the load from one network to the other network. For example, for a call blocked in the wireline network because of a failed switch, the callers would reattempt their calls over the wireless network. This results in a shift of load from the wireline to wireless network. If such calls are successfully completed over the wireless network, we can say that the wireless network alleviates the problem in the wireline network, and hence, increases the resilience of the telecommunications infrastructure. On the other hand, if these reattempt calls congest the wireless network, and cause the blocking of calls in this network, we can say that the wireline network impacts the performance of the wireless network negatively. In the following section, we investigate this interaction between networks in detail using the N-SMART simulation model.
THE METROPOLITAN NETWORK MODEL
We have analyzed a number of metropolitan areas in the course of our work. In this paper, we chose a medium sized metropolitan area, where there are as many wireline subscribers as wireless subscribers. In addition, we also assume that the traffic created by each wireless subscriber equals the traffic created by each wireline subscriber in Erlangs. Based on current trends; this is a reasonable representation of the expected future network. Metro Network: 900,000 wireline subscribers and 900,000 wireless subscribers NETWORK ASSUMPTIONS We design the Metro network to carry the normal expected traffic at peak hour. We use high usage trunk groups [7] to carry the bulk of the traffic and then allow any blocked calls to go over final trunk groups to the Local Tandems (LTs) or Access Tandems (ATs) based on the type of call. The design goal was to guarantee a maximum blocking of less than 1% on any given route. In addition, we build high usage trunks only if there is sufficient traffic to utilize the trunk group. Figure 1 shows the routing allowed in the network. The dashed routes in Figure 1 are high usage routes and the solid routes are the final routes. The dashed and solid routes of a given color show the routing rules for that traffic type. Therefore, looking at the blue trunks, we see that traffic between two Mobile Switch Centers (MSCs) is sent over a high usage trunk group, and in case that high usage group is not available, the call is sent via the corresponding ATs of the two MSCs. The normal traffic pattern in a telecommunications network changes as a function of the time-of-day. During certain hours of the day, the traffic is at a maximum while during other hours it is very small. This is represented by a traffic profile, as shown in Figure 2 , in the N-SMART model. HISTORICAL DISRUPTION SCENARIOS During a disaster (or similar) scenario, telecom users are impacted by events that unfold around them and they respond in ways that almost invariably cause some stress on the telecom network. Oftentimes, these changes are difficult to predict ahead of time. However, in many instances, it is possible to foresee the trends that are likely to occur. It is therefore possible to develop disaster response plans that would incorporate mitigation strategies that can minimize the resulting disruptions. To show how a disaster can affect the telecom network, we present the following actual events and how they led to varying levels of network disruptions. These scenarios show how traffic is affected as a result of user behavior in heavier call volume, more persistent calling and the ability to use one or both networks given the conditions at hand. First, we show the baseline traffic pattern for our network under normal operating conditions ( Figure 3 ). There are 9 statistics in Figure 3 as All of these statistics, with the exception of ACTIVE, are call counts within 5-minute intervals. ACTIVE is a snapshot of the total number of calls at the sampling instant. Figure 3 shows call statistics for the baseline scenario, also representing the 24-hour traffic profile for our metropolitan area. The busy hour is from 16:00 (4 PM) to 20:00 (8 PM). Under normal conditions (no disruptions), most first attempts are admitted and complete except for a fraction encountering no answer or busy. But most of them are retried and complete on subsequent attempts if the user does not abandon.
We present a discussion of the simulation results in the following sections. Our objective is to compare how each network is affected by the failure condition, and, where instructive, the impact on the individual subnetworks within the overall network CASE 1: HEADLINE NEWS CONDITION This condition envisions a sudden rise in call volume on all telecom networks. This is also accompanied by a more persistent re-attempt behavior on the side of the users. This means the following: Figure 4 .
The red line indicates the normal peak hour traffic level. Overload traffic condition occurs at 14:00 and continues until 21:00, where traffic returns to the peak normal traffic. Figure 5 shows the overall traffic results for Case 1. Note the clear rise in generated calls at 14:00, which leads to a rise in switch blocking and trunk blocking. This occurs as a result of increased demand even though the network does not suffer from any failure at that time. Figure 6 shows the impact of the traffic overload in terms of blocked calls. It shows the blocking caused by switch (green region) and trunk (red region) blocking. The regions in the plot are cumulative, therefore, the overall height of the curve indicates the total blocking at any given time. We see that call blocking rises slightly above 40% at peak blocking conditions. CASE 2 -MAJOR EVACUATION The factors that lead to traffic overload in this case are the number of users that are confined to use their wireless phones without wireline access. We model an (2 times) overload of wireless traffic and also disable wireless users on the originating side from switching to their wireline phones. Figure 7 shows the impact of traffic overload during the evacuation on the entire network. Again we see the switch blocking and trunk blocking become a significant factor quickly after the traffic overload. This simulation was done with normal reattempt behavior. However, we also tested another scenario with frantic reattempt and we observed greater blocking at peak hours. Figure 8 shows the overall temporal blocking for Case 2. Total blocking reaches 50% at peak level. Switch blocking also is more of a factor in this case.
CASE 3 -EMERGENCY CONDITION
We model the E911 (2 times) overload by overloading the traffic on the major wireline switches. This leads to an overall increase in traffic, which is substantially, less than a 2 times global overload. However, it also simulates the uneven distribution of the overload and the greater burden posed on E911 service centers. We also assumed a frantic reattempt behavior, as would be expected for blocked emergency calls. Figure 10 shows the overall temporal blocking for Case 3. Peak blocking reaches 26%. Overall traffic blocking in this scenario is much less than in Cases 1 and 2.
MITIGATION OPTIONS
The previous sections showed significant congestion resulting from typical customer behavior during emergencies. We studied several mitigation scenarios ranging from changing customer behavior to ones affected by the service providers. To illustrate the dependence of network degradation on subscriber behavior, we show how network blocking is affected by the probability of subscribers reattempting their calls, and then how that is further impacted by the average waiting period before a reattempt is made. The results are shown in Figure 11 which corresponds to Case 1. Similar results are expected for the other Cases. pends on the scenario at hand. Therefore, in cases where it is critical to reach emergency operators locally, the telecom providers may choose to drop most or all of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) traffic that uses modems during the peak conditions. This will free up some circuits that can be used in completing more critical voice calls. In addition, long distance traffic can be reduced in favor of allowing local traffic to complete more readily. We simulated these cases by completely dropping ISP traffic and reducing long distance traffic to 50%. The results showed varied improvements for the 3 Cases. * Changes in subscriber behavior drive network congestion during emergencies. * If re-attempt probability can be decreased and the time between reattempts can be increased on the part of subscribers, network congestion is reduced dramatically. One way to accomplish this is to encourage subscribers via broadcast radio and television to use their phones selectively. This reduces traffic load and increases the probability of successful call completion.
* Frantic reattempt behaviors (those with high probability of a reattempt, and a smaller wait interval between reattempts) are especially degrading to overall network performance. * Reducing less critical traffic in an emergency condition (like ISP and long distance) can help reduce overall blocking during peak hours of use. * Lastly, network management controls are not usually executed within local metropolitan area networks as they are in long distance networks. Adopting network management controls in local networks would be another way to reduce networks congestion. This might require expensive modifications to switches, which are not likely for legacy networks. For newer IP based networks, these management controls should be considered. FUTURE DIRECTIONS So far we have been dealing with circuit switched voice networks, which dominate today in metropolitan carrier networks. More and more telecommunication networks are starting migration to IP-based networks, supporting VOIP (Voice Over IP). In addition, the network architecture is changing to support the requirements of newer and more advanced services. The modeling of this network evolution and its impact on the critical infrastructure are future goals in our study.
